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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE 
CHRISTENSEN and JAHES 
N. TUCKER, 
Case Nos. 16147, 16040 
and 16019 
Defendant-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants, KENNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, were 
convicted as charged of the offenses of Aiding Escape and Theft 
of an Operable Hotor Vehicle in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge presiding. This brief is 
intended to apply to appellants KElJNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTEN-
SEN and treats only the conviction of the crime of Aiding Escape. 
Appellants KENNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTENSEN join in a separate 
brief dealing with the conviction of the crime of Theft of an 
Opecable Motor Vehicle. 
DISPOSITION m THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were sentenced to prison for the term as provided 
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by law for both charges, which sentences were to run concurrently, 
after a jury found them guilty of the offenses of Aiding Escape 
and Theft of an Operable Hotor Vehicle. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered on both 
counts, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS 
At the trial in the above entitled matter, Glenn Hudson, 
a Records Identif~cation Officer at the Utah State Prison, testified 
regarding the status of the three appellants in the above entitled 
action on the date of April 19, 1979. After laying a foundation 
regarding the records that he had in his possession, State's 
Exhibit 2-S was admitted which showed that the appellant JAHES Il. 
TUCKER had been committed to the Utah State Prison for an indeter-
minate term as provided by law for a crime of Rape, of not less 
than one nor more than fifteen years. Also admitted were records 
purporting to be an order for a 90-day evaluation for the appellant 
KENNETH SHARP (State's Exhibit 5-S) and a similar order for the 
appellant GEORGE CHRISTENSEN (State's Exhibit 6-S). 
On the face of the above documents it appeared that the 
appellant JAHES N. TUCKER was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison 
pursuant to a valid commitment ''hile the appellants SHARP and 
CHRISTENSEN were in the Utah State Pr~son only for the purposes 
2 -
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of testing and evaluation. 
Paul Christensen testified that on the 18th day of April, 
1978, he was employed at the Utah State Prison and that he knew 
all three of the appellants (R. 205). Mr. Christensen testified 
that on the day in question he had taken the three appellants out 
to work in an area of the farm on the Utah State Prison grounds. 
Some hour and a half later, he returned to discover two shovels 
together in one portion of the ditch, and a third shovel at the 
other end of the field (R. 220). 
Mr. Christensen then reported the three appellants missing. 
He further testified that some time later he was called to an area 
in Butterfield Canyon where he made an indentification of two 
of the appellants, SHARP and CHRISTENSEN. 
Eleanor Collard testified for the State that on the 19th 
day of April, 1978, she was employed and on duty for Riverton 
City. She further testified that around 3:00 in the afternoon 
she had an occasion to see three young men walking down the street 
side by side (R. 231). Darlene Ruark testified for the State 
that on April 19, 1978, she was working at Save More Television 
at approximately 12600 South on Redwood Road (R. 238). She further 
testified that on that day at approximately 2:45 she observed 
three males in front of t:he windows in the store (R. 2"-0). Marsha 
Ruark testified that on April 19, 1978, she was also at Save More 
Television and that she arrived there betv1een l: 00 and l: 30 in the 
afternoon in a white 1971 Cadillac. Some time bebveen 2:30 and 
- 3 -
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3:00 she obser~ed a person to ~al~ ~r~e~:-, in~o :~e s:J=e a~~ 
shor::y thereaf:er, she ~eard a~ e~g~~e sta=t. 
front door and looked out to observe '":.er ca:: ":Jei:::g cri·:e:-, a~,·a·, 
(R. 249). Mars:Ca ?-uark f'-lrt:Cer test::.:::.ed ::':at s:Ce ga·:e r.o one 
permission to take ~er car from the place where it was parked 
on the day in question. :~s. Ruark reported the t~eft o: her 
automobile to the police authorities and Leonard Soock and o::icer 
wbipple, among others. le::t i::: purs;.:i: o:: t~e vehicle. c::ice:: 
'>~nipple spotted the ·.rehicle and several officers joined in a 
chase. The Cadillac proceeded at a high rate of speed, runni:-~g 
cars off the road a;--,c r· . .mning a stop sign in at least one location 
(R_ 289). Severa: ~alice cars pursued the vehicle at speeds up 
to 70 and 80 m. p. :-,. 1 ?,. 291), event'.lally following into an area 
of Butterfield Canyon. The total distance of the c~ase ~.;as 
approximately five miles (R. 299). The appellant, JA}!ES :l. 7T:CKE?., 
was observed by the officers to be driving t~e vehicle. 
At the conclusion of the chase, the appellants SHARP and 
GIRISTE:·lSE~l, passengers in the vehicle, abandoned t~e vehicle, 
fled in one direction and were captured shortly t~ereafter. The 
driver, TUCKER, fled in another direction and Has subsequentl? 
apprehended in the neighboring vicinity by a citizel'! in the area. 
:1a::sha and Darlene Ruark testified that, ~hen ::hev had recovered 
the vehicle later, the license plates had not ":Jeen removed o:: 
altered and that the vehicle did not appear :o ]e dacaged, excep: 
tor being covered '.vi th dirt and sr..eared -,.,::_ :::h :~e "d:.:s t" :::"'.a::: ~-.-a~ 
- 4 -
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used to test for fingerprints on the vehicle (R. 243, 253). 
Appellant TUCKE~ testified under oath that on the 19th day 
of April, 1978, he 'vas in the Utah State Prison on a cormnitment. 
He also testified that on April 19th he was put on a work detail 
and he left on his own and without any aid froQ the appellants 
SHARP and CHRISTENSEN (R. 233). 
Appellant TUCKER further testified that some time later 
he ran into the other two appellants in Riverton. He said that 
he had been drinking during the course of the morning while at the 
prison, and that in Riverton he began to sober up to the point 
~.;here he resolved to go back to the prison. He and appellant 
SHARP started to hitchhike back towards the prison, when appellant 
CHRISTENSEN drove up in a 1971 Cadillac. Appellant TUCKER testi-
:ied that they then resolved to drive around a little bit before 
going back to the prison and turning themselves in (R. 237). 
Appellant TUCKER further stated that when he saw the 
police he panicked and fled in the vehicle. He ended up driving 
to the Butterfield Canyon area, where he was subsequently apprehended. 
- 5 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS, SHARP AND CHRISTENSEll, WERE IN-
APPROPRIATELY CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF AIDI~lG 
ESCAPE HHEN THEIR ACTUAL OFFENSE, IF ANY, WAS 
THE CRIME OF ESCAPE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR. 
Appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN have been charged and 
convicted under Utah Code Ann. §76-8-310 (1953), which provides 
in pertinent part: 
Aiding Escape--(1) A person is guilty of an 
offense it: 
(a) he aids another person to escape from 
official custody, . 
(2) An offense under this section is a felony 
of the second degree if: .. 
(b) a person to whom the aid or item to 
facilitate escape is given is a prisoner 
confined in the state prison; . 
Appellants contend that the State produced insufficient evidence 
to warrant a conviction on the offense of Aiding Escape for reasons 
stated below. 
A . I:HEllT ELE}!ElJT 
Both the principal offense of Escape, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-8-309 (1953) and Aiding Escape, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-310 
(1953) lack a specific intent requirement. Ctah Code Ann. 
§76-2-102 (1953) provides that every offense not involving strict 
liability shall require a "culpable mental state." \,'"here a c:Jar-
ticular statute does not specifv a culpabie mental state require~ 
- ij -
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for the offense, §76-2-102 states a requireQent of intent, know-
ledge or recklessness. Thus, for the offenses of escape and aiding 
escape, either an intentional, knowledgeable or reckless mental 
state of the accused to commit the offense must be proven. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953) requires that: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly com-
mits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be liable as a party for such conduct. 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
Thus, the mental intent for the principal offense and the aiding 
offense must be the same. Appellant TUCKER, as the principal 
offender, intended his escape while appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN 
did not share TUCKER's intent to effect their escape. The fact 
that TUCKER and the other two appellants were seen with each other 
after appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN escaped is no evidence 
that they assisted each other in escaping from the prison farm, 
and does not evidence intent on appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN's 
part, either intentional, knowing or reckless, to effect TUCKER's 
escape. There is no evidence in the trial record to indicate 
that appellants intended to aid TUCKER in his escape. "Aiding" 
means that "the aider must stand i:1 some relation ':O the crime 
::ts the criminal, approach it from the same angle, c•uc:h it at the 
same :Joint, and posses criminal intent". State v. 3earden, 405 
385 (Ariz. 1965) (Arizona Aiding Statute simi~::tr to Utah 
CoJe Ann. §76-2-202). Appellants, present at the prison farm for 
- 7 -
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a 90-day evaluation, possessed only the intent necessary to effect 
their escape, which would constitute a Class B Misdemeanor. The 
fact that TUCKER later joined them and the fact that TUCKER was 
a prisoner lawfully confined, were mere fortuitous events for 
which appellants should not be held accountable for absent the 
intent to commit the crime for which they were charged and con-
victed. 
B. ESCAPE 
Escape is defined as the unla,vful departure of a prisoner 
from the limits of his custody. State v. Jones, 36 P.2d 530 
(Idaho 193'"-J ?eoole v. Quijada, 199 P.854 (Calif. 1921) (prisoner 
unlawfully going beyond "'alls of prison is guilty of escape and 
not attempted escape, though he was captured while within the 
territory connected with the prison grounds). Appellants contend 
that the escape of TUCKER was complete when TUCKER walked away 
from the prison groun·ds and ended before he joined appellants. 
Hhere the escape is complete, and absent evidence of aiding 
(see infra), the conviction cannot stand on an aiding escape 
charge. In State v. Faulk, 136 So.601 (Fla. 1931) the Court, in 
regard to common-law escape, determined that "once the prisoner 
has succeeded in getting beyond the custody of and out of sight of 
the custodian, the escape is complete." 136 So. at 603. A 
prisoner, who was where he had no right to be without permission, 
even though it was not clear whether he was within or without the 
- s -
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area owned by prison, was guilty of escape where he removed him-
self from "the imposed restraint over his person and volition." 
People v. Quinters, 241 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. 1976). According to 
TUCKER's own testimony, he joined appellants after his escape was 
complete in terms of his removal from the imposed restraint over 
his person and volition. 
Orth v. United States, 252 F.566 (C.A.4 1918), involved 
a prisoner who had escaped from an Atlanta, Georgia prison in 
August and appeared in Charleston, South Carolina, where the 
defendant resided. There was evidence that the defendant aided 
and protected the prisoner and assisted him in leaving Charleston. 
Defendant was convicted of aiding an escape but the Circuit Court 
of Appeals found: 
The evidence furnished no foundation for conviction 
of the charge of aiding Fay to escape from lawful 
custody. Hhen the physical control has been ended 
by flight beyond immediate active pursuit, the 
escape is complete. After that aid to the 
fugitive is no longer aiding his escape. ~ 
Wharton, Cr.L. 2606; 1 Russell on Crimes, 467, 
10 R.C.L. 579; Smith v. State, 8 Ga. App. 297, 
68 S.E. 1071; State v. Ritchie, 107 N.C. 857, 
12 S.E. 251. 
252 F. at 568. 
Physical control over TUCKER was ended when he walked away 
from the prison farm and entered the town of Riverton. That is 
evident from his testiQ0ny when he entered a bar for a drink. 
-::':1e escape was complete 2nd any aid to EcCKER after that Has not 
aiding an escape. 
,\ppe llan ts con tend, in fact, that even if the escape •vas 
- 9 -
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not complete, the evidence does not show that they aided TUCKER. 
C. AIDI!lG ELE}1ENT 
Aiding means to incite, encourage, instigate, or supple-
ment commission of an offense. State v. Atwood, 492 P.2d 1279 
(N.M. 1972); State v. Roberts, 336 P.2d 151 (Ariz. 1959). 
To aid an escape or to aid in the general sense requires 
an intent to give aid and pricipal offender must know of the in-
tent to give aid, Maxwell v. State, 43 So.2d 323 (Ala. 1949), 
and if there is no prearrangement or preconcert between persons 
charged with crime, mere presence of one of them to give aid if 
necessary is not ~iding unless principal offender knew of such 
presence with intent to aid. Wright v. State, 333 So.2d 215 
(Ala. 1976); State v. Cydzik, 211 N.W. 2d 421 (Wise. 1973). It 
is not essential that there be a prearranged concert of action, 
however, in the absence thereof, it is essential that the aider 
£hould in some way advocate or encourage the commission of the 
crime. Coleman v. State, 121 A.2d 254 (l1d. 1956). There is no 
evidence indicating that appellants intended to assist TUCKER in 
any means nor that appellants were even a'vare of TUCKER's intentions. 
Also, TUCKER did not indicate that he knew of appellants alleged 
intentions to assist him. The record si!7tpl? shows appellants 
engaging in a Class B Xisdemeanor escape when TUCKER happened along. 
There was no preconcert, no arrangement, no plan or co~on design. 
There was mere presence of the appellants '"i th TUCI~ER, who, b:' his 
- 10 -
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escape, committed a felony. Mere presence, absent a showing of 
criminal intent, is not enough. \lright v. State, supra. In 
addition acquiescence in the actions of another is insufficient 
to constitute "aiding". State v. Stark, 490 P. 2d 511 (Ore. 1971). 
Appellants merely acquiesced to TUCKER's committed felony. Any 
action taken by appellants while in the presence of TUCKER was 
not for the benefit of, or to "aid, assist, encourage or supple-
ment" TUCKER's acts. Their conduct does not fall within the 
purpose of the statute. 
D. PUBLIC POLICY 
In reviewing cases wherein defendants were convicted of 
aiding an escape under statute, the obvious purpose of the statutes, 
similar to Utah Code Ann. §76-8-310, is not aimed at appellant's 
conduct. 
Even in situations where prisoners act in concert when 
each is endeavoring to effect his ow~ escape, there is stronger 
evidence than in this case of conduct that falls within the statute. 
In Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873), two persons confined in jail 
under charges of felony, acting in concert, set fire to the jail 
for the purpose of burning a hole through which they may escape, 
each intending to effect his ow~ escape. The defendants acted 
::.:ct:ent:ionally tO\vard a corr.mon purpose, i.e. breaking out. There 
i3 no such evidence in the instant case. 
In People v. Creeks, 149 P.82l (Cal. 1924), there was 
- 11 -
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Pvidence of a conspiracy to escape. There was no evidence in 
appellants' case of intent to aid TUCKER much less conspire to 
aid him escape. In State v. Navarro, 163 A. 103 (Me. 1932), 
the evidence showed that defendant was told that some prisoners 
had escaped, drove to the jail and was later found with the 
escaped prisoners. The Court found this conduct to fall under the 
aiding an escape statute. The Court found an intention to assist 
the prisoners. In State v. Cooper, 272 A. 2d 557 (N.J. 1971), 
defendant's acts consisted of breaking out of his cell block, 
opening the other cell block and attempting to take over the 
prison whic~ aided in the escape of other prisoners. Appellants' 
conduct certainly is not consistent with those acts which have 
been found to constitute the aiding of an escape under statutory 
law and, hence, is not under the purpose of the statute. 
E. CONFLICTING STATUTES 
Appellants were charged and convicted under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-310 (1953): 
Aiding escape--(1) A person is guilty of an 
offense if: ... 
(a) he aids another to escape from official 
custody; 
(2) An offense under this section is a felony 
of the second degree if: 
(b) a person to whom the aid or item to 
facilitate. escape is given is a prisoner 
confined in the state prison; l 
l. Historv: C. 1953, 76-8-310, enacted b? L. 1973, ch. 196, 
§76-8-310.-
- 12 -
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Appellants contend that their conduct is more specifically covered 
by Utah Code Ann. §76-8-309 (1953): 
Escape--Term for escape from state ~rison-­
(1) A person is guilty of escape i he 
escapes from official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second 
degree if: . . 
(b) the actor escapes from confinement 
in the state prison. Oth2rwise, escape 
is a Class B Misdemeanor. 
\,'here appellants were not "confined" but rather at the prison for 
a 90-day evaluation, the grade of offense applicable is a Class B 
Misdemeanor. It is clear that the above statute is more narrowly 
drawn than Utah Code Ann. §76-8-310 (1953). The above statute 
specifically singles out prohibited conduct as charged against 
appellants, i.e. escape. 
Rules of common law statutory interpretation as well as 
rulings by the Utah Supreme Court clearly establish the proposition 
that when DvO statutes encompass the same criminal conduct, the 
more specific statute or the latest statute to be enacted should 
be applied. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 143, 453 P.2d 146 (1965). 
The Shondel case is directly on point to the case at bar. 
That case involved an overlap of the Drug Abuse Control Law and 
the ~larcotic Drug Act which were both enacted during the same 
session at t~e 1967 Legislature of Utah. Shondel was charged with 
possession of the drug LSD. The Drug Abuse Control Law provided 
a misdemeanor penalty for that offense while the Narcotic Drug 
Historv: 
§76-8-309.· 
C. 1953, 76-8-309, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, 
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Act made the same offense a felony. The Supreme Court held that 
the clear, specific and lesser penalty prescribed for the offense 
of possession of LSD was applicable rather than the more sever 
penalty provided by overlapping provisions at the Narcotic Drug 
Act. Accord, Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d ll08 (Utah 1977), State 
v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978). 
In State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled on a similar matter. In that case, 
the defendant was convicted of utterinp, a forged prescription. 
The Supreme Court ruled that an amendment by the Legislature 
making the uttering of a forged prescription subject to legis-
lative fiat, one of which would penalize an accused as a misde-
meanant and the other as a felon, gave accused the benefit of 
being accountable only for the lesser of the two penalties-
In the case at bar, the statute under which appellants 
were convicted, §76-8-310, was enacted at the same time that the 
more applicable statute, §76-8-309, was enacted. The Utah Supreme 
Court noted in both the Shondell and Fair decisions that where 
there is a conflict between the legislative acts, the latest 
will ordinarily prevail. That rule is obviously not controlling 
here where the statntes were enacted at the same time. The holding 
of Shondell, Fair, RaiT~el and Loveless, supra, that the clear, 
specific and lesser penalty prescribed shall be applied when two 
statutes encompass the same conduct in controlling. The statute 
under which appellants ''ere convicted is not specific and narrm-1 
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when co~pared to the more applicable statute, §76-8-309. In 
Shondell, supra, the Court stated: 
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule 
that where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to an 
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit 
of the lesser. 453 P.2d at 148. 
Since §76-8-309 refers specifically to an escape and appellants 
would be punishable only as to a Class B l1isdemeanor, as compared 
to the §78-6-310 Second Degree Felony penalty, appellants are 
entitled to the benefit of that lesser punishment under §76-8-309. 
Numerous jurisdictions have also held that where a statu-
tory conflict exists, the more specific provision or statute will 
be applied. In Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 
322 P.2d 381, 7 Utah 2d 221 (1958), the Utah Supreme Court was 
faced with a dispute between the Board of Examiners and the Board 
of Education as to which body had the authority to administer 
the Department of Education. The Court noted that general rule 
of statutory interpretation that "as to conflicting statutes, the 
more specific takes precedence over the general . . Bateman, 
supra, 381 at 389. 
The premise is well established that when two statutes 
conflict the more specific statute governs. See 3arum v. State 
Compensation fund, 134 P.2d 505, 30 C.2d 575 ,''_=iY.6); Ex Parte 
Shull, 146 P.2d 417, 23 C.2d 745 (1944); State v. Backman, 368 
P 2d 793, 149 Colo. 542 (1962); In Interest of Waterman, 512 P.2d 
466, 212 Kan. '326 (1973). 
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There is an indisputable rule of statutory construction 
which is applicable to the case at bar: \Jhen two statues encolilpass 
the same criminal conduct, the more narrow or specific statute 
governs. Related to that doctrine is the rule that where there 
is doubt, the accused should be given the benefit of the lesser 
penalty. Since the escape statute, §76-8-309, covers more speci-
fically the appellants' conduct and the penalty under that statute 
is lesser, appellants are entitled to the the benefit of that 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants contend, given the inappropriate nature of 
the charge of Aiding Escape, that the conviction for the crime 
of Aiding Escape should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal 
should be entered, or in the alternative, that the appellants 
should be granted a new trial. 
DATED this day of October, 1979. 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant Sharp 
KEVIN KL'R\J1AADA 
Attorney for Appellant Christensen 
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